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Abstract
A key prediction of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences and loss aver-
sion in second-price auctions with private values is that the number of bidders should
affect bids in auctions for real objects but not in auctions with induced monetary val-
ues. In order to test this distinctive comparative statics prediction, we develop an
experiment where subjects bid in multiple auctions for real objects as well as auctions
with induced values, each time facing a different number of rivals. Our results are
broadly consistent with expectations-based reference-dependent preferences and loss
aversion. We find that in real-object auctions bids decline with the intensity of compe-
tition whereas in induced-value auctions, instead, bids do not vary with the intensity
of competition. Our results suggest that bidders may behave differently in real-object
auctions than in induced-value ones, casting some doubt on the extent to which findings
from induced-value laboratory experiments can be transferred to the field.
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1 Introduction
The second-price sealed-bid auction, first introduced in Vickrey’s (1961) seminal paper
and hence also known as simply the Vickrey auction, is probably the most famous and easily
understood auction format. It is well-known that in standard private-value auction models
of fully rational bidders with standard preferences, bidding one’s own value is a (weakly)
dominant strategy. This theoretical prediction holds irrespective of bidders’ risk attitudes,
the number of bidders in the auction, symmetry (or lack thereof) in the values’ distributions
or whether the values are correlated. Moreover, this prediction is very robust as it holds
in many different settings. For example, it continues to hold in models where bidders have
non-standard (risk) preferences, i.e. anticipated regret as in Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) or
ambiguity aversion as in Chen et al. (2007), or where bidders are not perfectly rational as
in Crawford and Iriberri’s (2007) analysis of level-k auctions.
However, if bidders have expectations-based reference-dependent preferences à la Köszegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007) (henceforth, KR), bidding one’s own value is not a dominant strategy
anymore. This occurs because a bidder’s beliefs about his likelihood of winning the auction,
and hence his reference point, are directly affected by his competitors’ strategies. Moreover,
as shown by Lange and Ratan (2010), the KR model makes different predictions in auctions
for real objects than in auctions with induced monetary values, the latter being the type
of auctions commonly run in most laboratory experiments.1 In particular, in real-object
auctions equilibrium bids should vary with the intensity of competition. Intuitively, when
the number of competitors in the auction increases, ceteris paribus a bidder expects to win
with a lower probability; this in turn lowers the reference point of a loss-averse bidder who
feels less attached to the object and hence bids less aggressively, for a large interval of
intrinsic values for the object. In induced-value auctions, instead, in the (unique) symmetric
equilibrium bidders bid their value. The reason for this discrepancy in the equilibrium bids
between real-object and induced-value auctions is as follows. In an auction for a real object
bidders trade off feelings of loss and gain across the different dimensions of utility. For
example, losing the auction feels like a loss in the product dimension and, at the same time,
as a gain in money dimension compared to the possibility of winning the auction. Therefore,
it is not possible for the bidder to eliminate losses on both dimensions simultaneously. With
induced values, on the other hand, there is only one dimension of utility, namely money, and
hence losing (resp. winning) the auction always feels like a loss (resp. gain).2
In this paper we present evidence from a laboratory experiment inspired by the theoretical
work of Lange and Ratan (2010) and aimed at testing the comparative statics predictions
1See also the related work by Eisenhuth (2018) who derives the seller’s revenue-maximizing mechanism
in an environment with independent private values where bidders have KR preferences.
2The notion that bidders, or people more generally, assess gains and losses separately across different
dimensions is related to the concept of mental (or psychological) accounting; see Thaler (1985, 1999).
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of the KR model in second-price private-value auctions. In the experiment, subjects took
part in auctions for real objects as well as auctions with induced monetary values. For each
“prize” a subject participated in three separate auctions, each time facing a different yet
known number of rivals. This within-subject design allows us to see whether and how a
participant’s bid for a given prize changes depending on how many rivals he is facing and
also to compare these changes for real-object auctions vs. induced-value ones.
At the aggregate level, our findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of the KR
model. For real-object auctions we find that increasing the intensity of competition pushes
bidders, on average, to bid less aggressively. In particular, for four of the six products that
we used in our experiment, we find that when the number of bidders increases from three
to twelve, the average bid declines by 7%. Furthermore, if we exclude from the analysis
those subjects who overbid in induced-value auctions, the negative effect of an increase in
competition on bids in real-object auctions becomes significant for five of the six products
and its magnitude doubles. In induced-value auctions, instead, we find that the intensity of
competition has no significant effect on bids. Besides providing support for the KR model,
these findings also suggest that bidders may behave differently in real-object auctions than
in induced-value ones, thereby casting some doubt on the extent to which findings from
induced-value laboratory experiments can be transferred to the field.
At the individual level, there is substantial heterogeneity in how subjects respond to
changes in the number of bidders in an auction. The vast majority of subjects changed their
bid when the number of bidders increases and, in line with the KR model, they changed it
more often in real-object auctions than in induced-value ones. While the fraction of subjects
who increased their bid when the number of bidders increases is roughly equal to the fraction
of subjects who reduced their bid, we observe that those reducing their bid do so by a greater
amount. We also find that 14.6% of subjects never change their bids when the number of
bidders increases, as predicted for instance by Expected Utility and Regret, while 10.55% of
them changed it in a way that cannot be explained by the KR model.
The KR model is related to models of disappointment aversion (henceforth, DA), such as
Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986) and Gul (1991), where outcomes are also evaluated
relative to expectations.3 Hence, in some of our sessions subjects completed also an individual
decision task originally designed by Sprenger (2015) and aimed at distinguishing the KR
model from DA models. In particular, the KR model features an “endowment effect for
risk” whereby people will be risk averse when their reference point is deterministic, and risk
neutral when their reference point is stochastic. By contrast, DA makes no such asymmetric
prediction as to the relationship between risk attitudes and reference points, because gambles
3Unlike the KR model, however, DA models do not define gain/elation and loss/disappointment separately
over consumption and money. Yet, if one were to incorporate this feature into DA models then, as shown by
Horowitz (2006), in second-price auctions with private values and real objects DA would make predictions
qualitatively similar to the ones of the KR model.
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are always evaluated relative to a deterministic reference point, that is the gamble’s certainty
equivalent. Successfully replicating the results in Sprenger (2015), we find evidence of an
endowment effect for risk which provides further support for the KR model.
Our paper is related to Banerji and Gupta (2014) who provide evidence in favor of the
KR model in an auction-like experiment using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (henceforth,
BDM) mechanism (Becker, DeGroot and Marschak, 1964). In the BDM mechanism, a single
bidder competes against a random bid drawn from a known distribution. If his bid beats
the random draw, he wins the prize and pays a price equal to the random draw; if his bid
is lower, on the other hand, he loses. It is easy to see that if preferences are standard, this
is an incentive-compatible mechanism (i.e., it is optimal to bid one’s value for the prize).4
Yet, with expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, it is in general not optimal to
bid one’s value in a BDM auction. Their experimental design exogenously manipulates the
expectations-based reference point by assigning subjects to one of two treatments: individu-
als bid against uniform distributions with supports [0, K1] in one treatment and [0, K2] in the
other, with K2 > K1. The KR model predicts that when the prize is a real object, bids in
the first treatment will stochastically dominate bids in the second one whereas no significant
differences in the distributions of bids should be observed for induced monetary values. De-
spite these similarities, there are three main differences between our paper and theirs. First,
while their experiment has a between-subject design, our experiment has a within-subject
design whereby each subject bids for the same prize three times, each time facing a different
number of rival bidders. This allows us to perform a direct test of the comparative statics
predictions of the KR model. Second, they run their experiment with only one real good (a
bar of dark chocolate) whereas we used six different goods, all of which are not perishable
and rather expensive. We believe that these better resemble the products that are often
sold in many real-world auctions; e.g., internet auctions. Last, their experiment looks at the
BDM mechanism which does not posses any element of strategic interaction; while under
standard preferences BDM is strategically equivalent to a second-price auction, it is not clear
a priori whether the predictions of the KR model would continue to hold in an environment
with strategic interaction. Complementing their and other existing studies, our experiment
features a strategic setting where subjects’ reference points and payoffs depend also on the
behavior of their competitors.
Eisenhuth and Grunewald (2018) also carried out a laboratory experiment with real
objects and induced values to test the predictions of the KR model in private-value auctions.
Differently from us, they find evidence for one-dimensional and against two-dimensional
reference dependence. Yet, they use a between-subject design and compare the revenue
4Due to this property, the BDM auction is popular as a mechanism to “elicit” subjects’ willingness to
pay and accept (WTP/WTA). However, see Cason and Plott (2014), Mazar et al. (2014), and Tymula et al.
(2016) on some of the limitations of the BDM mechanism for consistently eliciting WTP/WTA measures.
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between the first-price auction and the all-pay one. Moreover, in their study each subject
bid in ten induced-value auctions but only one real-object auction. The differences in the
design, therefore, could potentially explain why our findings differ.
More generally, our paper contributes to the recent and growing literature testing the
predictions of expectations-based reference dependence. Studying the performance of pro-
fessional golfers, Pope and Schweitzer (2011) present evidence of reference dependence in
putting performance around par on golf holes, which is complemented by further analysis
showing a responsiveness of individual golfers’ performance to average field performance, a
plausible expectation. Similarly, Card and Dahl (2011) document an increase in domestic
violence after unexpected NFL losses, which is indicative of a responsiveness to expectations
of victory. Crawford and Meng (2011) show that NYC cabdrivers’ labor-supply decisions
can be rationalized by a model with expectations-based reference dependence in the do-
mains of hours worked and daily earnings. Abeler et al. (2011) present evidence from a
real-effort experiment where piece rates are probabilistically replaced with fixed payments.
Though the fixed payment should not affect subjects’ effort choices under classical prefer-
ences, the authors document a responsiveness to the fixed payment which is consistent with
expectations-based reference dependence. Building on this design, Gneezy et al. (2017)
put the theory to a stricter test by studying whether behavioral responses are monotone
in changes in expectations, as predicted by the theory. By documenting a substantial non-
monotonicity in the effort responses, the authors conclude that these fixed payments affect
reference points in a more complex way than predicted by expectations-based models. In
a modification of a standard endowment effect experiment, Ericson and Fuster (2011) find
that individuals with a high experimental probability of being able to exchange are willing
to do so with a higher probability than individuals with a low probability of being able to
exchange. However, using similar experimental designs, Heffetz and List (2014) and Goette
et al. (2014) fail to replicate the results of Ericson and Fuster (2011). Gill and Prowse
(2012) experimentally analyze a two-player real-effort sequential game and document a dis-
couragement effect consistent with expectations-based reference dependence. In a laboratory
consumption experiment with randomized prices, Karle et al. (2015) document a relation-
ship between consumption choices after the price realization and subsequently measured loss
aversion that is consistent with expectations-based reference dependence. Using a similar
setup, however, Wenner (2015) fails to find support for expectations-based models. Hence,
while the first bulk of evidence, gathered from both the field and the lab, indicated that ex-
pectations play an important role in shaping reference points, more recent laboratory studies
have documented some clear violations of the model’s directional predictions.
Finally, our paper also contributes to the extensive experimental literature on Vickrey
auctions with private values. Several studies have found that subjects deviate from the dom-
inant strategy of bidding their values, with overbidding being somewhat more common than
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underbidding (Kagel et al., 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Harstad, 2000; Cooper and Fang,
2008; Garratt et al., 2012; Georganas et al., 2017). By contrast, experimental evidence
from the strategically equivalent ascending English auction demonstrates almost immedi-
ate convergence to the dominant strategy; see also Li (2017) on the notion of “obviously”
strategy-proof mechanisms. Our paper departs from this literature on two main aspects.
First, while these papers only considered induced-value auctions, we also analyze auctions
with real objects. Second, while the literature’s main focus has been on testing whether
bidders adopt the dominant strategy of bidding their value, our paper’s focus is not on over-
bidding per se; instead, we test the comparative statics predictions of the KR model about
how individual bids are affected by the degree of competition in the auction.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3
describes the experimental design and the data. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5




Consider a risk-neutral seller auctioning an object to n ≥ 2 bidders via a second-price
sealed-bid auction. Assume bidders have independent private values.5 Each bidder’s valua-
tion (type) θi, for i = 1, ..., n, is drawn independently from the same continuous and strictly






Bidders have expectations-based reference-dependent preferences as formulated by Köszegi
and Rabin (2006). In this formulation, a bidder’s utility function has two components:
U [cg, cp|rg, rp, θ] = θcg + cp︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption utility
+ θμ (cg − rg) + μ (cp − rp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain-loss utility
(1)
where cg, rg ∈ {0, 1} capture the good dimension and cp, rp ∈ R capture the money
dimension. First, if he wins the auction at price p, i.e. cg = 1 and cp = −p, a type-θ bidder
experiences consumption utility θ−p, which represents the classical notion of outcome-based
utility. Second, the bidder also derives gain-loss utility from the comparison of his actual
consumption to a reference point given by his recent expectations (probabilistic beliefs). The
function μ is assumed to be two-piece linear with a slope of η > 0 for gains and a slope of
ηλ > η for losses. The parameter η captures the relative weight a consumer attaches to
gain-loss utility while λ is the coefficient of loss aversion. By positing a constant marginal
5Independence is not crucial for our results, but it simplifies the analysis.
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utility from gains and a constant, but larger marginal disutility from losses, this formulation
captures prospect theory’s (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991)
loss aversion, but without its diminishing sensitivity. According to (1), a bidder assesses gains
and losses separately over product and money. For instance, if his reference point is that he
does not get the product (and thus pays nothing), then he evaluates getting the product and
paying for it as a gain in the product dimension and a loss in the money dimension rather
than as a single gain or loss. This is consistent with much of the experimental evidence
commonly interpreted in terms of loss aversion.6
Because in many situations expectations are stochastic, Köszegi and Rabin (2006) ex-
tend the utility function in (1) to allow for the reference point to be a pair of probability
distributions H := (Hg, Hp). In this case a bidder’s utility can be written as
U [(cg, cp) |Hg, Hp, θ] = θcg + cp + θ
∫
rg
μ (cg − rg) dHg +
∫
rp
μ (cp − rp) dHp (2)
In words, a bidder compares the realized consumption outcome with each possible out-
come in the reference lottery. For example, if he expected to win the auction at price p
with probability q, then winning the auction feels like a gain of ηθ (1− q) in the product
dimension and a loss of −ηλp (1− q) in the money dimension. Similarly, losing the auction
results in a loss of −ηλθq and a gain of ηpq. Thus, the weight on the loss (gain) in the overall
experience is equal to the probability with which he was expecting to win (lose) the auction.
Each bidder learns his type before bidding and, therefore, maximizes his interim expected
utility. If the distribution of the reference point is H and the distribution of consumption
outcomes is G := (Gg, Gp), a type-θ bidder’s interim expected utility is given by
EU [G|H, θ] =
∫
{cg ,cp}
U [(cg, cp) |Hg, Hp, θ] dG.
After placing a bid, a bidder basically faces a lottery between winning or losing the
auction and the probabilities and potential payoffs depend on his own as well as the other
players’ bids. The final outcome is then evaluated with respect to any possible outcome
from this lottery as a reference point. As laid out in Köszegi and Rabin (2007), Choice
Acclimating Personal Equilibrium (CPE) is the most appropriate solution concept for such
decisions under risk when uncertainty is resolved after the decision is made so that the
decision maker’s strategy determines the distribution of the reference point as well as the
distribution of final consumption outcomes; that is, G = H.
6This feature is able to explain the endowment effect observed in many laboratory experiments (see
Kahneman et al. 1990, 1991). The common explanation of the endowment effect is that owners feel giving
up the object as a painful loss that counts more than money they receive in exchange, so that they demand
a lot of money for the object. But if gains and losses were defined over the value of the entire transaction,
owners would not be more sensitive to giving up the object than to receiving money in exchange.
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The following assumption, maintained for the remainder of the paper, guarantees that
all bidders participate in the auction for any realization of their own type, and that the equi-
librium bidding functions derived in the next sections are strictly increasing and continuous:
Assumption 1 (No dominance of gain-loss utility) Λ ≡ η (λ− 1) ≤ 1.
This assumption places, for a given η (λ), an upper bound on λ (η) and ensures that a
bidder’s equilibrium expected utility is increasing in his type. What it requires is that the
weight a bidder places on expected gain-loss utility does not (strictly) exceed the weight he
puts on consumption utility.7
Each bidder can place a bid b ∈ [0, w] where w denotes bidders’ symmetric monetary
endowments (or budgets). Throughout the paper, we assume that the budget constraint does
not bind and we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in pure and (strictly) monotone
strategies. We consider both real-object and induced-value second-price auctions.
2.2 Real-Object Auctions
For given bidding strategies of the other players let F (b) denote a bidder’s probability
of winning the auction with a bid equal to b; that is, the probability that the largest of his
opponents’ bids is lower than b. Then, the reference-dependent expected utility of a bidder
of type θ is given by
EU (b, θ) =
∫ b
b(0)









(p− s) dF (s) dF (p)− ΛθF (b) [1− F (b)]
where b (0) denotes the bid submitted by the lowest type.8 The first term on the right-
hand-side of (3) is standard expected (consumption) utility. The other terms capture ex-
pected gain-loss utility and are derived as follows. The second term captures the expected




pdF (p) and losing the auction and saving
∫ b
b(0)
pdF (p). The third term
reflects the expected comparison, still on the money dimension, between the realized winning
7Eisenhuth and Grunewald (2018), using data from first-price and all-pay auctions with induced monetary
values, obtain an estimate for Λ of 0.42 (with a standard error of 0.16), which is statistically different from
0 and 1 at all conventional significance levels. Using data from a BDM-like auction for real products
(chocolate bars), Banerji and Gupta (2014) obtain an estimate for Λ of 0.283 (with a standard error of 0.08),
also statistically different from 0 and 1 at all conventional significance levels.
8Expression (3) is equivalent to expression (10) in Lange and Ratan (2010). The only difference is that
they assume a weight of zero on gains and a positive weight on losses whereas we, following the original
formulation of Köszegi and Rabin (2006), posit a positive weight on gains and a larger weight on losses.
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price p and all the other prices s the bidder expects to pay with positive probability. The
fourth and last term describes the expected gain-loss utility on the good dimension when
expecting to win the auction with probability F (b). Finally, notice that risk neutrality is
embedded in the model as a special case since Λ = 0 if either η = 0 or λ = 1.
Lange and Ratan (2010) showed that in the unique monotone symmetric equilibrium a
bidder of type θ bids according to the following bidding function:
β∗ (θ, n) = θ
{





















where Hn−1 denotes the CDF of the highest order statistic among n − 1. Indeed, in a
symmetric equilibrium F (b) = Hn−1 (θ) as a type-θ bidder expects to win when all his
opponents have a type lower than θ. The following proposition compares the loss-averse bid
with the risk-neutral one and summarizes some key comparative statics implications.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and let θm be such that Hn−1 (θm) = 0.5. Then
β∗ (θ, n) satisfies the following properties:
(i) β∗ (θ, n) is continuous and increasing in θ.
(ii) There exists a θ′ > θm such that β∗ (θ, n) < θ for θ ∈ [0, θ′].








< 0 for all θ such that H (θ) < e−
1
n−1 .
(v) The average bid is decreasing in n if h′ (θ) ≤ 0 or if n is large.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 delivers several interesting implications. First, it shows that loss aversion
has a ”bifurcating” effect whereby bidders with low values bid less than their value whereas
the opposite holds for bidders for high values. In particular, loss aversion pushes all bidders
who expect to win with less than 50% probability to underbid. The intuition for this result
is straightforward. Recall that when comparing the outcome of winning (resp. losing) the
auction to the counterfactual, a loss-averse bidder with type θ experiences expected gain-loss
(dis-)utility proportional to −ΛHn−1(θ)[1 −Hn−1(θ)]. Notice that Hn−1(θ)[1 −Hn−1(θ)] is
maximized at Hn−1(θ) = 0.5, which is the point where the bidder faces maximal uncertainty
between winning and losing the auction. Bidders who expect to win with less than 50%
probability do not feel attached and therefore bid less aggressively to keep their expectations
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low and mitigate their disappointment if they lose. Next, it is easy to see that a player’s
equilibrium bid depends on the number of bidders. Under Assumption 1 we have that
∂β∗(θ,n)
∂n
< 0 for all θ such thatH (θ) < e−
1
n−1 . This (sufficient) condition implies, for example,
that if two auctions in this symmetric setting have n = 6 and n′ = 12 bidders respectively,
then all bidders whose values fall within the lowest 82 percent of the distribution of values
will bid less when the number of bidders is larger. The intuition is as follows. When the
number of bidders in the auction increases, ceteris paribus a bidder expects to win with a
lower probability. Low-value bidders already expect to win with a rather small probability to
begin with so for them losing the auction is not such a big loss in terms of forgoing the object
whereas winning the auction would entail quite a painful loss because of the unexpected
expenditure; hence, they react to the increase in competition by reducing their bid in order
to keep their expectations low and reduce their feelings of loss from not winning the auction
(but making a big splash if they do win). On the other hand, high-value bidders expect to
win the auction and pay some money with a rather high probability and, therefore, they
react to an increase in competition by bidding even more aggressively in order to reduce
the chance of experiencing a painful loss from not obtaining the object. In other words,
low-value bidders are more sensitive to losses in the money dimension whereas high-value
bidders are more sensitive to losses in the object dimension. Finally, the average bid is
decreasing in n if the number of bidders is large enough or if high types are rare. When
n increases, the probability of winning the auction decreases for all bidders except the one
with the highest type. Hence, the measure of types who reduce their bids is increasing with
n. Figure 1 provides a graphical example to illustrate the comparative statics with respect
to the number of bidders. It is easy to see that as n increases, the average bid declines.
2.3 Induced-Value Auctions
In an auction with induced monetary values each subject is given a voucher and, if he
wins the auction, he can redeem the voucher from the experimenter in exchange of a pre-
specified dollar amount, say $θ. Hence, his intrinsic payoff is θ − p if he wins the auction at
price p and zero otherwise. Crucially, in an auction with induced monetary values there is
only one dimension of consumption utility, namely money. Then, the reference-dependent
expected utility of a bidder of type θ is given by
EUIV (b, θ) =
∫ b
b(0)
(θ − p) dF (p)− Λ [1− F (b)]
∫ b
b(0)






(p− s) dF (s) dF (p) .
9
Figure 1: Equilibrium bidding functions for n = 3 (dashed), 6 (dotted) and 12 (solid) with
Λ = 2/3 and θ distributed uniformly on [0, 30].
where b (0) denotes the bid submitted by the lowest type. The first term on the right-
hand-side of (5) represents standard expected (consumption) utility. The second term cap-
tures the expected gain-loss utility when comparing the outcome of winning the auction,
which yields an expected monetary payoff of
∫ b
b(0)
(θ − p) dF (p), and the outcome of losing
the auction, which yields a payoff of 0. Finally, the last term reflects the expected gain-loss
utility when comparing winning the auction at price p and winning at all the other prices s
which the bidder expects to pay with positive probability.
The bidding strategy of a loss-averse bidder in an induced-value auction is quite different
from his strategy in a real-object auction. The reason is that in an auction for a real object
the bidder trades off feelings of loss and gain across different dimensions — for example,
losing the auction feels like a loss in the product dimension and a gain in money compared
to the possibility of winning the auction — and it is not possible for the bidder to eliminate
losses on both dimensions simultaneously. In an auction with induced monetary values,
instead, losing the auction always feels like a loss compared to the possibility of winning
the auction. As shown by Lange and Ratan (2010), in the unique monotone symmetric
equilibrium a bidder of type θ bids according to the following bidding function:
β∗IV (θ) = θ.
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Therefore, in induced-value auctions the equilibrium behavior of a loss-averse bidder
coincides with that of the “classical” model. Hence, we should observe (even loss-averse)
subjects bidding the same amount irrespective of the intensity of competition.
3 Experimental Design
Each participant in our study took part in twelve auctions: three auctions for each prize
and four prizes in total. Specifically, for each prize, a participant took part in: a second-price
auction with two competitors (n = 3), a second-price auction with five competitors (n = 6)
and a second-price auction with eleven competitors (n = 12). The prize that the participant
bid on and the total number of people participating in the auction changed randomly from
one auction to another. Manipulating the number of auction participants allowed us to test
our main hypothesis: whether the number of bidders in the auction, other things being equal,
affects average and individual bids. In each treatment, in the real-object auctions we offered
three different products with significant market value (ranging from $13.95 to $49.95); in
the induced-value auctions, we offered a money voucher that subjects could redeem for a
prespecified dollar amount. Monetary values for the vouchers $x
U∼ {1, 2, 3, ..., 29, 30} were
drawn independently across subjects.9 A subject’s value $x for the voucher stayed constant
throughout the experiment. Subjects’ own monetary values were their private information,
but the distribution of values was common knowledge. Each participant bid three times for
every prize, once for each auction size, for a total of twelve auctions.
In the beginning of each auction, participants were told what prize they were bidding
on and how many people in total were participating in the auction (three, six or twelve).
After the participant submitted his/her bid, the program automatically moved on to the next
auction without providing any feedback on the auction outcome. We did not provide feedback
because we wanted to ensure that participants considered each auction to be independent
from the others. For each auction, participants were given a $30 endowment that they could
use to bid in the auction and were allowed to bid any integer amount between $0 and $30.
Their budget in each auction was always $30 and the money saved in one auction could not
be rolled over to the next one. Therefore, the auctions were independent in terms of budget
constraint: whatever happened in one auction had no monetary consequences for the other
auctions. Participants submitted their bids privately using a computer interface. Figure 2
shows an example of a decision screen.
To convincingly compare real-object auctions and induced-value auctions, we ran two
versions of the experiment. In the first version, which we call “others’ prize same” treatment,
when participants bid on a prize, they knew that all the other participants in the auction
were bidding on the same prize. This is a realistic set up motivated by real-world auctions
9Throughout the paper the symbol $ denotes Australian dollars (AUD).
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Figure 2: Example of a decision screen. The bidder is bidding for a money voucher valued
at $21. Three bidders (including the decision-maker) participate in this auction.
where all participants bid on the same object. However, one could object that there is a
potential confound in such design because when participants bid on a real object, they knew
that all the other participants bid on the same real object with the same market value, but
when they bid in an induced-value auction the monetary value of other bidders’ voucher
was unknown to them. In other words, one could argue that the values in the induced-value
auctions were independent while the values in real-object auctions were not, thereby creating
a confound.10 We addressed this concern with a perhaps less realistic treatment that we call
“others’ prize unknown”. In this treatment, when participants bid on a real object they
knew that others were bidding on a real object as well, but they did not know which one.
Therefore, in the “others’ prize unknown” treatment a participant never knew the (market
or induced) value of the prize that other participants were bidding on, ensuring that in both
induced-value and real-object auction the values are independent.11
To cater to different tastes, we included three different real-object prizes in each treat-
ment. In the “others’ prize same” treatment we used: a voucher for two cinema tickets, a
Logitech Boombox, and a University of Sydney hoodie.12 In the “others’ prize unknown”
treatment we used: a voucher for two cinema tickets, a University of Sydney t-shirt and a
University of Sydney mug.13 As people who are not interested in buying a particular good
10We thank a referee and an advisory editor for pointing this out to us.
11Notice that the fact that other participants might be bidding on a different item does not affect a
participant’s bidding incentives under Expected Utility Theory (as well as Regret Theory, Level-k, etc.);
hence, it is still a (weakly) dominant strategy for a bidder to bid his/her value, no matter how many
competitors s/he faces.
12At the time of the experiment, the market prices of the products were $39, $49.95, and $39.95 respectively.
13At the time of the experiment, the market prices of the products were $42, $24.95, and $13.95 respectively.
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would simply bid $0, and therefore be insensitive to the number of people in the auction,
we included three different real-object prizes with the intent to increase the chance that
each participant would find at least one of the goods desirable. Two prizes remain the same
between the treatments while two were replaced due to the lack of availability in the store.
We ran a total of sixteen sessions — eight in each treatment. Twelve participants took
part in each session resulting in a total of twenty-eight auctions run in each individual
session: four auctions with all twelve participants (one for each prize), eight auctions with
six participants (two for each prize) and sixteen auctions with three participants (four for each
prize). Groups of participants in each auction were selected at random and participants did
not know the identity of people whom they were bidding against. The order of the auctions
was randomized independently for every participant. Participants knew that at the end of
the experiment one of the twenty-eight auctions that took place during the session would be
selected for payment (we call this the “payout auction”). Subjects who did not participate
in this auction received nothing. Subjects who participated in the payout auction but did
not win the auction, received the $30 endowment.14 The participant with the highest bid in
the payout auction received the prize and paid for it a price equal to the second-highest bid,
leaving him/her with $30 minus the second highest bid in cash, plus the prize.
After the auction task was over, subjects completed an independent individual decision-
making task with a between-subject design. This task followed the same procedures as in
Sprenger (2015) who designed an experiment aimed at distinguishing the KR model from
models of Disappointment Aversion (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sudgen, 1986; Gul, 1991). We
present the description of the task and the results that are in line with the original paper in
Appendix B. This task was included only in the “others’ prize same” treatment.
After completing the tasks, subjects answered a short questionnaire (for questions see
Appendix F). The total earnings for participation in the study were given by the sum of a
$10 show up fee and earnings in the auction task. In the “others’ prize same” treatment,
participants also received earnings from the individual decision-making task.15
14It it important to highlight that a losing bidder in the payout auction still received the $30 endowment.
We decided to do so, and stressed this feature of the payment rule during the instructions-reading phase of
the experiment, because we wanted subjects to realize that winning (resp. losing) the auction implies a loss
of money (resp. product) and a gain of product (resp. money).
15In both the auction task and the individual decision-making task, subjects were randomly paid for one
of their choices. This random-lottery incentive mechanism, which is widely used in experimental economics,
introduces a compound lottery in the decision environment. While this is inconsequential for a decision-maker
under standard expected utility, because of the reduction of compound lotteries property, the randomization
introduces some further complications in the KR framework as it creates a potential link between choices
and reference points across tasks. Yet, the random-lottery incentive mechanism is innocuous also in the
KR framework under “narrow framing/bracketing ”whereby subjects consider each decision in isolation (see
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 and Rabin and Weizsäcker, 2009). While we cannot ensure that our subjects
did indeed consider each auction in isolation, we notice that the order of auctions was random across subjects
and no outcome was revealed until the end of the experiment. As for the individual decision-making task,
in a series of experiments involving decisions over risky prospects, Starmer and Sudgen (1991) and Cubitt
et al. (1998) provide evidence that in practice subjects treat these decisions effectively in isolation.
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Before completing each task, participants received detailed instructions (available in Ap-
pendix D). To make sure that the rules of the second-price auction were clear to everybody,
each participant had to answer detailed comprehension questions before starting the task. If
a participant failed a question (or part of it), the experimenter explained the task verbally
and gave the participant a second set of comprehension questions to complete. Most partic-
ipants answered all the questions correctly at the first attempt. All of them answered them
correctly within two attempts. Comprehension questions are available in Appendix E.
A total of 192 subjects (83 males; average age: 23 +/-4.24 SD) took part in the study,
which took place in the experimental laboratory of the University of Sydney. Data for “oth-
ers’ prize same” treatment was collected between May and June 2015 and data for “others’
prize unknown” treatment was collected in April 2018. The protocol was approved by the
Human Ethics Research Committee at the University of Sydney. The study was implemented
using ZTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
4 Results
Given the predictions of our theoretical framework, in this section we test two main
hypotheses about participants’ bids:
Hypothesis 1 Bids in real-object auctions depend on the number of bidders. Specifically,
the average bid declines in the number of auction participants.
Hypothesis 2 Bids in induced-value auctions are not influenced by the number of bidders.
4.1 Summary Statistics
As there were no differences in design between the two treatments for the induced-value
auctions, we combine data from all these auctions together for the ease of presentation and
discussion. We begin by providing some summary statistics on participants’ bids in Table 1.
The actual participation in the auctions was high, with participants biding sizable amounts
on each prize and rarely bidding $0. Out of 288 bids for each good, only 9, 11, 8, 10, 13 and
14 were equal to $0 for movie tickets in “others’ prize same”, boombox, hoodie, movie tickets
in “others’ prize unknown”, t-shirt and mug, respectively; moreover, only 24 out of 576 bids
on the money voucher were equal to $0. There was substantial variation in individual bids
on each of the items suggesting that different people assigned different value to each good.
To assess whether subjects changed their bid for the same prize, for each participant
we computed the standard deviation of his/her bid separately for each prize. This gives
us a total of seven standard deviation indexes for a participant, one for each prize (see the
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Table 1: Summary statistics of bids for each good
mean min max sample SD within individual SD
others’ prize same treatment
movie 15.72 0 30 9.62 2.09
boombox 19.22 0 30 10.51 2.88
hoodie 17.76 0 30 10.68 2.36
others’ prize unknown treatment
movie 18.36 0 30 9.86 2.44
t-shirt 14.52 0 30 10.28 2.16
mug 10.71 0 30 9.80 1.94
voucher 15.43 0 30 10.01 1.67
averages in last column in Table 1). If participants bid always the same amount, this index
should be equal to zero, implying that auction size did not affect bids. To the contrary, the
standard deviation of individual bids for a particular prize is on average equal to 2.15. It is
the smallest for the money voucher (1.67) and largest for boombox (2.88).
For each prize, Table 7 and 8 in Appendix C summarize the self-reported familiarity,
ownership, desire to buy, feeling of being budget constrained when bidding, willingness to
pay and intended use statistics that were obtained in the post-experimental questionnaire.
4.2 Real-Object Auctions Results
To establish whether the observed within-subject and within-good variation in bids is
driven by the number of participants in the auction, we first calculated average bids for each
good and each auction size (Table 2). In line with Hypothesis 1, average bids for all real
objects decline as the number of participants in the auction increases from three to twelve,
on average by $1.10. Similarly, they also decline as the number of participants increases
from six to twelve, on average by $0.80, for all goods except movie tickets in “others’ prize
unknown”. Notice that instead the bids on the money voucher change by less than $0.01
when the number of participants increases from three to twelve and by $0.35 when the
number of participants increases from six to twelve. For movie tickets, boombox and mug,
the average bid also declines when the number of participants increases from three to six.
To verify whether the relationship between bids and number of auction participants is
significant, in our estimation we need to account for the fact that each individual may value
each good differently. We do this in two different ways, each leading to the same qualitative
conclusions. In the main text, we present the results from a random effects model and in
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Table 2: Mean bid by good and auction size
3 participants 6 participants 12 participants
others’ prize same treatment
movie 16.10 15.93 15.12
boombox 19.70 19.32 18.64
hoodie 18.04 18.21 17.02
others’ prize unknown treatment
movie 18.95 17.98 18.14
t-shirt 14.85 14.90 13.82
mug 11.43 10.93 9.76
voucher 15.32 15.66 15.31
Appendix C we report the results from the regressions with individual-good fixed effects.16
Pooling all prizes together, we find that bids are significantly lower when there are three
or six participants in the auction as compared to auctions with twelve participants (Table
3). Importantly, the effect is stronger when we focus only on real-good auctions and it
disappears when we focus only on induced-value auctions.
To gain more insight and to see whether the results from the “pooled” regressions hold
also at the individual good level, in Table 4 we regressed individual bids on auction size
dummy variables separately for each good. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, individuals bid
significantly more for movie tickets in the “others’ prize same” treatment, hoodie, t-shirt and
mug in 3-bidder auctions compared to 12-bidder ones. While the coefficient for boombox is
among the highest, it misses significance. This may be related to three possible explanations
that emerge from our post-experimental questionnaire: (i) subjects were least familiar with
this product and this might introduce noise in the bids, (ii) a high percentage of subjects
indicated that they felt budget-constrained when bidding on the boombox and, therefore, by
capping bids at $30 we precluded ourselves from seeing the effect for some of the participants,
and (iii) a high percentage of subjects stated they would resell the boombox if purchased; if
bidders plan to resell the prize, the KR model predicts that they should treat the good as
cash and so there should be no effect of the number of participants on bids.
Similarly, the coefficient on the movie tickets in the “others’ prize unknown” treatment
is not significant. It is hard to speculate why this may be the case based on the self-reported
16According to the Hausman test, the error term and the regressors are not correlated and hence the
random effects model is more appropriate to analyze our data (χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00). There are however
significant differences in bids across individual-good pairs, indicating we should use random effects rather
than a simple OLS regression (χ2 = 1716.13, p < 0.001, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test).
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Table 3: Effect of auction size on bids. 3 participants (6 participants) is an indicator variable
equal to one when the participant is bidding in an auction with 3 (6) bidders. The reference
category is auction with 12 bidders. Subject-good random effects are included. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
all prizes real goods money voucher
3 participants 0.82∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.20) (0.24) (0.33)
6 participants 0.68∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.35
(0.20) (0.24) (0.33)
constant 15.39∗∗∗ 15.42∗∗∗ 15.31∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.44) (0.72)
No. of obs 2304 1728 576
measures in Tables 7 and 8. However, we note that the price of the movie tickets increased
from $39 to $42 in the time between the data from the two different treatments were collected,
making the movie tickets go from being the least expensive product in the “others’ prize
same” treatment to being the most expensive one in the “others’ prize unknown” treatment.
Hence, in both treatments we fail to detect a significant effect for the most expensive and
highest valued product. One reason for this might be a form of context-dependent reference
effects, not captured by the KR model, whereby bidders would not be negatively affected
by an increase in the intensity of competition for the good that they perceive to be more
valuable. An alternative explanation, more in line with the KR model, is that high-value
bidders might actually increase their bids in response to an increase in the intensity of
competition. Therefore, while the average bid should still decline with number of bidders,
the presence of high-value bidders who increase their bids might weaken the overall effect.
This mechanism is especially relevant for the “others’ prize unknown” treatment where a
subject bidding on the most expensive/valuable item (the movie tickets) is more likely to
be a high-value bidder, and hence expects to win with a rather high chance, since his/her
competitors are more likely to be bidding on a less expensive/valuable item. Finally, we
notice that subjects bid significantly more for hoodie, t-shirt and mug in the auction with
six bidders than in the auction with twelve bidders.
In Appendix C, we present additional analysis and robustness checks. We briefly discuss
these here. A substantial fraction of bids (17%) in our sample were equal to the maximum
possible bid ($30), suggesting that some subjects may have felt budget constrained. Thus,
to account for the censored nature of the data we estimated a Tobit random effects model.
The results (see Table 10) are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4. Moreover, we find
an even stronger, negative effect of competition in real-object auctions if we exclude those
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Table 4: Effect of auction size on bids. 3 participants (6 participants) is an indicator variable
equal to one when the participant is bidding in an auction with 3 (6) bidders. The reference
category is auction with 12 bidders. Subject-good random effects are included. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
other’s prize same others’ prize unknown
movie boombox hoodie movie t-shirt mug voucher
3 participants 0.99∗∗ 1.06 1.02∗ 0.81 1.03∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.50) (0.71) (0.57) (0.63) (0.57) (0.45) (0.33)
6 participants 0.81 0.68 1.19∗∗ –0.16 1.07∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.35
(0.50) (0.71) (0.57) (0.63) (0.57) (0.45) (0.33)
constant 15.11∗∗∗ 18.64∗∗∗ 17.02∗∗∗ 18.14∗∗∗ 13.82∗∗∗ 9.76∗∗∗ 15.31∗∗∗
(0.98) (1.08) (1.09) (1.01) (1.05) (1.00) (0.72)
No. of obs 288 288 288 288 288 288 576
participants who overbid in induced-value ones (see Table 11), suggesting that the KR model
describes better the behavior of more rational participants. Removing participants who re-
ported to be budget constrained eliminates significance for all goods except the mug (see
Table 12); we suspect this may be driven by the correlation between reporting to be con-
strained and having a high desire/being a serious bidder for the prize (desire for constrained
was 4.85 vs. 3.48 for not constrained, p < 0.001). Finally, if we exclude participants who
indicated that they would resell the prize (see Table 13), the estimated coefficients are similar
to those in Table 4, but with some loss in significance. Hence, we conclude that overall, at
the aggregate level, our experimental evidence supports Hypothesis 1:
Result 1 Participants on average bid less in real-object auctions as the number of auction
participants increases.
We end this section by remarking that our aggregate findings cannot be rationalized
by alternative models of choice under uncertainty, like regret or ambiguity aversion, nor
by a model of less-than-fully-rational bidders like level-k. Furthermore, the two leading
hypotheses that have been put forward to rationalize overbidding in most experimental
second-price auctions, the spite hypothesis and the “joy of winning” hypothesis, cannot
explain our findings either. Indeed, while these hypotheses predict that bidders would bid
more than their intrinsic value in a second-price auction, the amount of overbidding is
independent of the number of bidders in the auction. Moreover, neither spite nor “joy
of winning” would predict a difference between real-object auctions and induced-value ones.
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Figure 3: Individual bids for money vouchers plotted against the induced voucher value.
4.3 Induced-Value Auctions Results
According to Hypothesis 2, the number of auction participants should not have a signifi-
cant effect on bids in the induced-value auctions. In line with this hypothesis, the standard
deviation in individual bids is the smallest for the money voucher (last column in Table 1).
In addition, the mean bid for the money voucher in our sample does not significantly change
as the number of bidders increases (Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4).
Regressing bids on the induced values we find that the correlation between the two is
highly significant. The coefficient on the voucher value is equal to 0.82 (resp. 0.78 and 0.74)
in auctions with three (resp. six and twelve) bidders, all with p < 0.001. Figure 3 plots
individuals’ bids against the value of their vouchers for each auction size. If subjects bid
exactly the value of their money voucher, all bids should fall on the 45-degree lines. However,
this is not what we observe. Averaging across all auction sizes, we find that 33.68% of the
bids were equal to the voucher value, 35.34% of bids were below the voucher value and
the remaining 31.08% were above it. Our fraction of value-bidding is in line with previous
experimental findings, but we observe more underbidding than overbidding. For instance,
Kagel and Levin (1993) found 27% of value-bidding, 5.7% of underbidding and 67.2% of
overbidding. In Cooper and Fang (2008) and Garratt et al. (2012) the same figures were:
44%, 16% and 40%, and 21.2%, 41.3% and 37.5%, respectively.
Overall, we conclude that the experimental evidence supports Hypothesis 2:
Result 2 The number of participants does not affect bids in induced-value auctions.
4.4 Individual Level Results
Now we turn to test whether our hypotheses hold also at the individual level. We find
significant heterogeneity in how subjects responded to changes in the number of bidders in
the auction. On average, participants changed their bid at least once for 2.41 prizes (out
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of 4) as the number of auction participants changed. Moreover, 14.58% of the participants
never changed their bid, 13.02% changed it for one prize, 16.67% for two prizes, 28.65%
for three prizes and 27.08% for all four prizes (including the money voucher). In line with
Hypothesis 2, participants changed their bids the least often for the money voucher.
Table 5 lists for each good how many subjects decreased, increased or did not change
their bids as the auction’s size changed. For example, considering auctions for the movie
tickets in the “others’ prize same” treatment, from Table 5 we see that 31 (resp. 26, 39)
participants decreased (resp. increased, did not change) their bid in an auction with twelve
bidders as compared to their bid in an auction for the same product with only three bidders.
Focusing on bid changes between 3-bidder and 12-bidder auctions, we find that 60% of the
subjects did not change their bid for the money voucher between 3-bidder and 12-bidder
auctions. The fraction of subjects who bid the same amount of money in 3-bidder and 12-
bidder auctions for movie tickets in “others’ prize same”, boombox, hoodie, movie tickets in
“others’ prize unknown”, t-shirt, and mug is significantly lower (41%, 40%, 49%, 43%, 53%
and 44%, respectively). Similar patterns were observed when the auction size changed from
three to six and from six to twelve.
Table 5: Number of participants that increase (↑), decrease (↓) or keep their bid constant
(-) as number of participants changes
3 to 12 3 to 6 6 to 12
↓ ↑ - ↓ ↑ - ↓ ↑ -
others’ prize same treatment
movie 31 26 39 26 22 48 25 23 48
boombox 26 32 38 22 31 43 24 23 49
hoodie 23 26 47 19 26 51 22 24 50
others’ prize unknown treatment
movie 26 29 41 25 22 49 20 28 48
tshirt 24 21 51 22 23 51 20 19 57
mug 36 18 42 21 19 56 28 16 52
voucher 32 44 116 33 43 116 40 45 107
all real goods 166 152 258 135 143 298 139 133 304
Interestingly, and seemingly contrary to our hypothesis, not all participants decreased
their bids as the number of bidders in the auction increased. It is clear from Table 5 that
the number of people who decrease their bid as competition in the auction increases is
roughly comparable to the number of those who do the opposite. The proportion of those
decreasing their bid as the number of bidders increases is higher if we treat small changes
in bids as no change (see Table 14 in Appendix C). What explains our aggregate results
in the preceding section is that on average the increases in bids were much smaller than
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the decreases in terms of dollar amounts (see Table 6). A series of one-sided t-tests reveals
that the differences between bids in 12-bidder and 3-bidder auctions are significantly lower
than zero for essentially all real goods, indicating that when the prize was a real object
subjects bid significantly less in 12-bidder auctions than in 3-bidder auctions.17 We find
similar significant effects for a change from six to twelve bidders in auctions for movie tickets
in “others’ prize same”, hoodie, t-shirt, and mug. By contrast, the difference between bids
in induced-value auctions of different sizes is never significantly different from zero.
Table 6: Changes in bids (in AUD) as the number of auction participants changes, conditional
on participants’ decreasing (↓) or increasing (↑) their bid. Average is the sample average.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 in a one sided t-test testing whether the average difference
between the bids is smaller than zero
3 to 12 3 to 6 6 to 12
↓ ↑ average ↓ ↑ average ↓ ↑ average
others’ prize same treatment
movie -6.58 4.19 -0.99* -3.54 3.41 -0.18 -6.68 3.87 -0.81*
boombox -9.08 4.20 -1.06* -7.91 4.45 -0.38 -8 5.5 -0.68
hoodie -9.70 4.81 -1.02* -4.15 3.67 0.17 -9.71 4.13 -1.19**
others’ prize unknown treatment
movie -7.29 3.86 -0.81 -6.80 3.50 -0.97** -7.63 6.00 0.16
t-shirt -7.79 4.19 -1.03*** -4.82 4.78 -0.04 -9.20 4.26 -1.07**
mug -6.03 3.14 -1.67*** -4.95 2.95 -0.50* -6.21 3.84 -1.17**
voucher -6.30 4.55 -0.00 -3.84 4.49 0.35 -6.38 4.16 -0.35
Another prediction of the KR model, as illustrated in Figure 1, is that for participants
with the highest valuations, we should observe a smaller decline (or an increase) in bids as the
number of participants in the auction increases. Thus, we would expect that if we excluded
these participants from our analysis, the decline in the average bid should be even stronger.
As we do not observe our participants’ true valuations, we decided to instead approximate
them by the average bid within an individual-good pair. Since our theoretical framework
is symmetric and equilibrium bids are strictly increasing in valuations, the participants
submitting the highest bids should be the ones with the highest valuations. In the “others’
prize same” treatment, we excluded the top 10% of bidders for each good (that is, bidders
with average bid equal or larger than $28.67 for movie tickets, and $30 for boombox and
hoodie). In the “others’ prize unknown” treatment, for movie tickets, T-shirt and mug we
excluded participant-good pairs where the average bid was above $29.67 (which represents
the 90th percentile for bids on these goods taken together). For the money voucher, the 90th
17p = 0.1002 for movie tickets in the “others’ prize unkwnon” treatment.
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percentile was at $29. We repeated the analysis presented in Table 4 excluding the top 10%
bidders and found that the results are indeed stronger (see Table 15 in Appendix C).
Finally, we notice that some of the patterns that we observe at the individual level cannot
be explained with the KR model. Specifically, under KR, if for the same prize a participant
bid less in a 6-bidder auction than in a 3-bidder auction, then this participant should also
bid less in a 12-bidder auction than in a 6-bidder auction. We find that the bids of 10.55% of
the participants violate this prediction and are therefore not consistent with the KR model.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We presented results from two laboratory experiments with a within-subject design,
aimed at testing a distinctive comparative static prediction of the KR model in second-price
auctions. Our results are broadly consistent with the KR model. In real-object auctions,
we find that subjects’ bids are affected by the number of competitors and, on average,
they decline with the intensity of competition. In induced-value auctions, instead, bids
are unaffected by the intensity of competition. These results also show that people behave
differently in auctions for real objects than in auctions with induced monetary values, casting
some doubts on the extent to which conclusions drawn from laboratory auctions with induced
valuations can be extended to real-object auctions in the field. We conclude the paper by
discussing some limitations of our design and possible directions for future research.
As the KR model makes different predictions for real-object auctions vs. induced-value
ones, we had subjects participating in both. While conducting real-object auctions in the
laboratory opens the door to considering many new interesting questions, it also has some
drawbacks. In particular, we cannot pin down what subjects’ intrinsic value for a product
is. Indeed, as argued by Banerji and Gupta (2014) and others, estimates of WTP that are
derived using the conventional BDM mechanism are likely to be significantly biased if agents
are loss-averse. As it is not possible to directly observe (and control for) subjects’ intrinsic
values, one possible concern in our experiment is the possibility that in real-object auctions
subjects have interdependent or common values. We addressed this potential confound with
our “others’ prize unknown” treatment whereby, when bidding in a real-object auction, a
subject knew that the other participants were bidding on a real object as well, but did not
know which one. This design makes the real-object auctions as analogous as possible to
the induced-value ones since subjects do not bid on the same good, but have probabilistic
beliefs about which goods their competitors are bidding on, just like in the induced-value
auctions a bidder knows the value of his/her voucher, but only knows the distribution from
which the values of his/her competitors’ vouchers are drawn. Furthermore, we notice that
the interdependent or common-value model usually applies to goods whose objective quality
or value is uncertain and for which bidders have access to different information. In our
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experiment, most subjects were highly familiar with the products and they all had the same
opportunity to inspect them before the auctions began.
Another possible concern when using real goods is the possibility of resale. We could have
avoided this issue by auctioning off some immediate consumption good, like a chocolate bar
or a sandwich. However, we chose to use durable, somewhat expensive items to cater to
different tastes and also to increase the chance that subjects in our experiment would find
at least one of the items to be appealing. Moreover, we wanted to use products that can be
reasonably found in actual auctions in the field. If subjects were only interested in the items
we selected for the purpose of reselling them, then they should have bid for them like they
bid for money vouchers. The fact that the observed bidding behavior in real-object auctions
was significantly different than the bidding behavior in the induced-value auctions suggests
that resale is not a major concern for our experiment.
Besides providing support for the KR model, our results have potentially interesting
implications for auction design. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showed that if bidders have
standard preferences, an auction with n + 1 bidders and no reserve price yields a higher
expected revenue than an auction with n bidders and an optimally set reserve price. Hence,
when facing the choice between introducing a reserve price or inviting an additional bidder
into the auction, a revenue-maximizing seller should always pick the latter. Our results,
however, suggest that this might not be the case if bidders are expectations-based loss-
averse, as increasing competition in the auction might induce (some) bidders to bid less
aggressively. Notice though that our results show that average bids decline with the intensity
of competition; yet, the effect on the seller’s revenue depends on how competition affects the
second-highest bid. Analyzing how reserve prices and varying the number of bidders might
affect revenue when bidders are loss-averse is an interesting question left for future research.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Part (i) follows from Lange and Ratan (2010). For part (ii),










β∗ (x, n) dHn−1 (x) + 2
∫ θ
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Moreover, the envelope theorem implies that
T (θ) = (1− Λ)
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Similarly, for the risk-neutral case the envelope theorem implies that
∫ θ
0







Combining (6), (7) and (8) we obtain
∫ θ
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Therefore, we have that
∫ θ
0
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− ΛC ′ (θ) > 0. (9)
To prove part (ii) notice that the sign of the expression on the LHS of (9) depends on
the sign of the following expression




θ − ΛC ′ (θ) . (10)
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Fix now a θ such that Hn−1 (θ) ≤ 0.5. A sufficient condition for expression (10) to be
negative is that C ′ (θ) ≥ 0. We have
C ′ (θ) = (n− 1)Hn−2 (θ)h (θ)
[
β∗ (θ, n)− 2
∫ θ
0
β∗ (x, n) dHn−1 (x)
]
≥ 0
⇔ β∗ (θ, n) ≥ 2
∫ θ
0
β∗ (x, n) dHn−1 (x)
⇔ β∗ (θ, n)− 2
[

















Hn−1 (x) dx ≥ 0.
As β∗ (θ, n) is increasing in θ, it follows that C ′ (θ) ≥ 0 for any θ ≤ θm. Hence, for any
such type expression (10) is negative, which proves the second claim.
To prove the third claim observe that


















where the inequality follows from Assumption 1. Hence, since β (θ, n) is continuous in θ,




for which β∗ (θ, n) > θ.
















H (θ)n−1 lnH (θ)−H (x)n−1 lnH (x)
]
+ [1 + (n− 1) lnH (x)]
}
h (x) dx







1− Λ + 2ΛH (x)n−1
]
. It’s easy to see that
2ΛH(θ)n−1θ lnH(θ)
1+Λ
< 0. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the whole derivative to be negative
is that the integral is negative.
First, notice that
1 + (n− 1) lnH (x) < 0 ⇔ H (x) < e− 1n−1 .
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H (x)n−1 lnH (x)
)




⇔ (n− 1)Hn−2 (x)h (x) [(n− 1) lnH (x) + 1] < 0
⇔ H (x) < e− 1n−1 .
This proves the fourth claim.
Finally, in order to prove (v) let β (n) :=
∫ θ
0









From claim (iv), we know that ∂β
∗(x,n)
∂n











= 1. Hence, dβ(n)
dn
< 0 if h′ (θ) ≤ 0
or if n is large. 
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B Appendix: Replication of Sprenger (2015)
This task followed the same procedures as in Sprenger (2015) who designed an experiment
aimed at distinguishing the KR model from models of Disappointment Aversion (Bell, 1985;
Loomes and Sudgen, 1986; Gul, 1991). The exact procedures are explained in Sprenger
(2015) and here we just outline the intuition. The task was designed in price list style with
21 decision rows. Each decision row was a choice between a certain amount and a gamble.
In each session, subjects were randomly separated into two groups. Half the subjects were
asked a series of certainty equivalents for a fixed gamble while the other half were asked
a series of probability equivalents for a fixed certain amount. Crucially, the fixed option
(the gamble in one case and the certain amount in the other) was always displayed on the
left. Sprenger (2015) argues that the option presented on the left becomes a reference point
against which the other option is compared. The unique prediction of the KR model is that
people will be risk-averse when the reference point is a certain amount and risk-neutral when
the reference point is a gamble.18 Thus comparing choices in these two treatments allows us
to perform a test of the KR model of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences at
the population level. Our participants completed Conditions 1.1 and 2.1 in Sprenger (2015).
See Figure 4 or Table 1 in Sprenger (2015). All participants were paid according to one
randomly selected choice from the task.
In figure 5 we classify each participant into one of three risk-attitude types: risk seeking
(S), risk neutral (N) and risk averse (A) using individuals’ switching points as the classifi-
cation criterion. Then, separately for each set of questions, we counted how many subjects
fell in each category. Figure 5(a) shows the results. We find that the number of subjects
that are classified as risk averse is significantly larger when the fixed option was the certain
amount than when the fixed option was the gamble. As this classification of responses is
rather strict, following Sprenger (2015) we then re-classified each participant’s risk-attitude
type by using a wider interval for risk neutrality. Under this classification, individuals are
classified as risk-neutral if their switching point interval includes risk neutrality or if it is
one row above or below. The results are shown in Figure 5(b). Just as in Sprenger (2015),
we find that also under this less strict classification the number of subjects classified as risk
averse when the fixed option was the certain amount is significantly larger than when the
18As explained in Sprenger (2015), this prediction holds under what Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) call
unacclimating personal equilibrium (UPE). Yet, following most of the literature, our analysis of the auction
game uses choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) as solution concept. Hence, our experimental tasks
impose (and test the implications of) two different solution concepts. However, we think that each solution
concept is the correct one for the task at hand. In the auction, subjects’ bids directly affect the distribution
of outcomes. Hence, it is conceivable that a subject’s reference point is determined (at least partially) by
his own bid. In the decision task, instead, subjects are presented with a series of binary choices that they
have to make, with one of the two options appearing in every choice, and always being displayed first. In
this case, as also argued by Sprenger (2015), it is conceivable that the reference point is (at least partially)
determined by the fixed, first option.
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Figure 4: A list of choices in the lottery task. Half of the participants were shown Panel A

















S N A S N Arisk attitude
safe referent risky referent

















S N A S N A
risk attitude
safe referent risky referent
(b) Risk Attitude Classification - Wide Interval
Figure 5: Classification of participants into risk seeking “S”, risk neutral “N” and risk
averse “A” based on their lottery choices. Two participants with multiple switching points
are excluded. There are 48 participants who completed the task with a safe referent and
46 participants with a risky referent. Subfigure (a) is based on the classifications using the
interval of a participant’s switch point. Subfigure (b) is based on a wider interval classification
including the switch point +/- one choice.
fixed option was the gamble. Moreover, when the fixed option is the gamble the majority
of subjects are now classified as risk neutral. Therefore, we conclude that also in this task
subjects in our study behaved consistently with the predictions of the KR model.
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C Appendix: Additional Tables
Table 7: Summary statistics of self-reported familiarity, ownership, desire to purchase,
financial constraints and valuation for each good. Familiarity with the good and desire
to purchase are measured on a 6-point Likert scale where 1 (6) indicates the lowest
(highest) familiarity and desire to purchase. Ownership is a binary variable taking
value of 1 (0) when individual reported to (not) own the good. Constrained is a binary
variable equal to 1 (0) when subject reported to be budget constrained (unconstrained)
when bidding in the auction. Valuation is self-reported willingness to pay for the good.
The exact wording of the questionnaire is available in Appendix F.
familiarity ownership desire constrained valuation
others’ prize same treatment
movie 5.55 0.38 3.32 0.09 15.07
boombox 3.63 0.05 3.60 0.27 22.06
hoodie 5.40 0.28 3.70 0.16 20.20
others’ prize unknown treatment
movie 5.49 0.15 4.16 0.15 19.25
t-shirt 4.90 0.32 3.27 0.05 16.24
mug 4.90 0.21 2.56 0.05 10.14
money voucher 4.40 0.20 16.52
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Table 8: Participants’ intended use for each prize.
Totals in “others’ prize unknown” treatment are lower
because some participants did not provide an answer.
own use gift resell other total
others’ prize same treatment
movie 55 27 6 8 96
boombox 45 27 13 11 96
hoodie 70 11 5 10 96
others’ prize unknown treatment
movie 67 17 4 3 91
t-shirt 65 22 4 4 95
mug 63 26 2 4 95
voucher 167 9 2 13 191
total 532 139 36 53 760
Table 9: Effect of auction size on bids. 3 participants (6 participants) is an indicator variable
equal to one when the participant is bidding in an auction with 3 (6) bidders. The reference
category is auction with 12 bidders. Subject-good fixed effects are included. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
others’ prize same others’ prize unknown
movie boombox hoodie movie t-shirt mug voucher
3 participants 0.99∗ 1.06 1.02∗ 0.81 1.03∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.50) (0.71) (0.57) (0.63) (0.57) (0.45) (0.33)
6 participants 0.81 0.68 1.19∗∗ –0.16 1.07∗ 1.17∗∗ 0.35
(0.50) (0.71) (0.57) (0.63) (0.57) (0.45) (0.33)
constant 15.11∗∗∗ 18.64∗∗∗ 17.02∗∗∗ 18.14∗∗∗ 13.82∗∗∗ 9.76∗∗∗ 15.31∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.51) (0.40) (0.45) (0.40) (0.32) (0.24)
No. of obs 288 288 288 288 288 288 576
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Table 10: Tobit analysis of the effect of auction size on bids. 3 participants (6 participants)
is an indicator variable equal to one when the participant is bidding in an auction with 3 (6)
bidders. The reference category is auction with 12 bidders. Censored at bid=30. Random
effects included. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
others’ prize same others’ prize unknown
movie boombox hoodie movie t-shirt mug voucher
3 participants 1.17∗∗ 1.29 1.18∗ 1.00 1.08∗ 1.77∗∗∗ –0.03
(0.56) (0.94) (0.71) (0.79) (0.66) (0.49) (0.38)
6 participants 0.86 0.88 1.45∗∗ –0.28 1.20∗ 1.27∗∗ 0.42
(0.56) (0.94) (0.71) (0.78) (0.66) (0.49) (0.38)
constant 15.67∗∗∗ 20.97∗∗∗ 19.07∗∗∗ 19.62∗∗∗ 14.76∗∗∗ 10.08∗∗∗ 16.06∗∗∗
(1.11) (1.48) (1.49) (1.27) (1.25) (1.09) (0.83)
No. of obs 288 288 288 288 288 288 576
Table 11: Effect of auction size on bids excluding subjects who always overbid on the voucher.
3 participants (6 participants) is an indicator variable equal to one when the participant is
bidding in an auction with 3 (6) bidders. The reference category is auction with 12 bidders.
Subject-good random effects are included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
others’ prize same others’ prize unknown
movie boombox hoodie movie t-shirt mug voucher
3 participants 1.21∗∗∗ 0.55 1.33∗∗ 1.42∗∗ 1.68∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 0.29
(0.44) (0.70) (0.63) (0.70) (0.68) (0.43) (0.40)
6 participants 0.89∗∗ 0.64 1.42∗∗ 1.04 1.14∗ 0.98∗∗ 0.41
(0.44) (0.70) (0.63) (0.70) (0.68) (0.43) (0.40)
constant 14.34∗∗∗ 18.43∗∗∗ 16.83∗∗∗ 16.28∗∗∗ 10.86∗∗∗ 7.44∗∗∗ 12.90∗∗∗
(1.05) (1.18) (1.20) (1.21) (1.20) (1.06) (0.76)
No. of obs 246 246 246 198 198 198 444
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Table 12: Effect of auction size on bids excluding subjects who felt constrained when bidding.
3 participants (6 participants) is an indicator variable equal to one when the participant is
bidding in an auction with 3 (6) bidders. The reference category is auction with 12 bidders.
Subject-good random effects are included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
experiment 1 experiment2
movie boombox hoodie movie t-shirt mug voucher
3 participants 0.80 0.69 0.72 –0.01 0.59 1.73∗∗∗ 0.25
(0.54) (0.84) (0.60) (0.60) (0.46) (0.47) (0.33)
6 participants 0.74 1.24 1.15∗ –0.95 0.45 1.36∗∗∗ 0.22
(0.54) (0.84) (0.60) (0.60) (0.46) (0.47) (0.33)
constant 14.77∗∗∗ 15.99∗∗∗ 15.91∗∗∗ 17.60∗∗∗ 13.81∗∗∗ 9.84∗∗∗ 14.51∗∗∗
(1.01) (1.23) (1.18) (1.07) (1.07) (1.03) (0.80)
No. of obs 261 210 243 246 273 273 459
Table 13: Effect of auction size on bids. The analysis excludes participants who indicated
that they would resell the prize if they win. 3 participants (6 participants) is an indicator
variable equal to one when the participant is bidding in an auction with 3 (6) bidders. The
reference category is auction with 12 bidders. Subject-good random effects are included.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
others’ prize same others’ prize unknown
movie boombox hoodie movie t-shirt mug voucher
3 participants 1.08∗∗ 1.08 0.93 0.86 0.92 1.59∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.53) (0.79) (0.59) (0.65) (0.58) (0.46) (0.34)
6 participants 0.87 0.78 1.14∗ 0.02 0.97∗ 1.10∗∗ 0.37
(0.53) (0.79) (0.59) (0.65) (0.58) (0.46) (0.34)
constant 15.63∗∗∗ 20.09∗∗∗ 17.37∗∗∗ 17.98∗∗∗ 13.79∗∗∗ 9.90∗∗∗ 15.21∗∗∗
(1.01) (1.10) (1.10) (1.03) (1.08) (1.02) (0.73)
No. of obs 270 249 273 276 276 282 570
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Table 14: Number of participants that increase (↑), decrease (↓) or keep their bid constant
(-) as number of participants changes. Changes of bids equal to or less than $3 are treated
as no change.
3 to 12 3 to 6 6 to 12
↓ ↑ - ↓ ↑ - ↓ ↑ -
others’ prize same
movie 20 8 68 10 10 76 17 6 73
boombox 18 15 63 14 13 69 16 12 68
hoodie 18 15 63 10 11 75 18 11 67
others’ prize unknown
movie 16 11 69 15 11 70 12 19 65
t-shirt 14 10 72 11 10 75 15 8 73
mug 22 8 66 12 5 79 16 7 73
voucher 14 22 156 12 19 161 20 16 156
all real goods 108 67 401 72 60 444 94 63 419
Table 15: Effect of auction size on bids excluding bidders with top 10% of the bids in
each auction. Ties (also at $30) result in different number of observations per good. 3
participants (6 participants) is an indicator variable equal to one when the participant is
bidding in an auction with 3 (6) bidders. The reference category is auction with 12 bidders.
Subject-good random effects are included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01.
others’ prize same others’ prize unknown
movie boombox hoodie movie t-shirt mug voucher
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
3 participants 1.12∗∗ 1.30 1.27∗ 0.93 1.15∗ 1.76∗∗∗ –0.00
(0.57) (0.88) (0.71) (0.73) (0.64) (0.48) (0.37)
6 participants 0.95∗ 0.84 1.49∗∗ –0.19 1.20∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.39
(0.57) (0.88) (0.71) (0.73) (0.64) (0.48) (0.37)
constant 13.22∗∗∗ 16.02∗∗∗ 13.82∗∗∗ 16.28∗∗∗ 11.74∗∗∗ 8.65∗∗∗ 13.53∗∗∗
(0.95) (1.15) (1.12) (1.03) (1.00) (0.94) (0.70)
No. of obs 255 234 231 249 255 273 513
37
